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CONNECTING THE DOTS:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL
TO FIND PROBABLE CAUSE
IN DOUGHERTY V. CITY OF COVINA
Carmelo Tringali*
The relationship between molesting children and possessing child
pornography is significant, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Illinois v. Gates sets a low threshold requirement for probable cause in
justifying search warrants. Nonetheless, federal circuit courts disagree
as to whether evidence of child molestation is sufficient in itself to
establish probable cause for a search warrant for child pornography. In
Dougherty v. City of Covina, the Ninth Circuit furthered this circuit
split by siding with the Second and Sixth Circuits in determining that
such evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause justifying a
search warrant. This Comment examines the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in
Dougherty and argues that the court incorrectly refused to find
probable cause justifying the search warrant and set a dangerous
precedent in doing so.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; A.B., June 2008, Harvard
University. I would like to sincerely thank Yxta Murray, Dean Jannell Roberts, Timothy Heafner,
Joshua Rich, and Christopher Alberico for their inspiration, guidance, and editorial judgment.
Even more appreciation is due to my loving and supportive parents, Salvatore and Genelle
Tringali.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal appellate courts across the nation are failing to connect
the dots in determining the validity of search warrants for child
pornography. This is so, at least, as it relates to the fair probability
that child molestation suspects also possess child pornography.
Indeed, in Dougherty v. City of Covina1 the Ninth Circuit failed to
make the logical and commonsense connection between sexually
abusing a child and possessing child pornography.2 There, an
investigating officer who submitted the affidavit for the search
warrant was experienced and specially trained in cases involving
juvenile and sex crimes.3 In addition, Bruce Dougherty, whom the
officer was investigating for inappropriately touching a sixth-grade
student, had been previously accused of molesting another student
and engaging in other pedophilic acts.4 The court, however, held that
the officer’s determination that there was a fair probability that
Dougherty possessed child pornography was “conclusory” and
“insufficient to create probable cause.”5
By so ruling, the Ninth Circuit joined the Second and Sixth
Circuits in making it more difficult for law-enforcement officers to
obtain search warrants and enforce statutes proscribing possession of
child pornography.6 This is particularly troublesome because child
pornography significantly harms the children involved.7 The U.S.
Senate, for instance, has found that “[c]hild pornography plays a
critical role in the vicious cycle of child sexual abuse and
1. 654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011).
2. See United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 2010) (“There is an intuitive
relationship between acts such as child molestation or enticement and possession of child
pornography.”). See generally Candice Kim, From Fantasy to Reality: The Link Between Viewing
Child Pornography and Molesting Children, PROSECUTOR, Mar.–Apr. 2005, at 17 (“The act of
viewing child pornography does not exist in a vacuum. The existence of images that sexually
exploit children represents tangible evidence of past, present and, most likely, future abuse.”).
3. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 896.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 899.
6. See United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Hodson, 543
F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008).
7. See generally S. REP. NO. 104-358 (1996) (committee report for the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1995); Anton L. Janik, Jr., Combating the Illicit Internet: Decisions by the
Tenth Circuit to Apply Harsher Sentences and Lessened Search Requirements to Child
Pornographers Using Computers, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 379, 382–85 (2002) (discussing
Congress’s intent for passing legislation increasing sentences for child pornographers).
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exploitation.”8 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Dougherty, however,
impedes society’s ability to protect the children that child
pornography victimizes.
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly refused
to find probable cause justifying the search warrant at issue in
Dougherty v. City of Covina. The facts of the case are established in
Part II, and the court’s reasoning is analyzed in Part III. Part IV then
explains that the Dougherty majority (1) misapplied United States v.
Weber;9 (2) unreasonably discounted the significant relationship
between molesting children and possessing child pornography; and
(3) should have upheld the search warrant under established Supreme
Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. Part V concludes by summarizing
the Ninth Circuit’s errors in Dougherty and encouraging the Ninth
Circuit en banc or, preferably, the Supreme Court to overrule
Dougherty or the precedent established in cases like Dougherty when
the situation to do so next presents itself.10
II. STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
On October 12, 2006, Officer Robert Bobkiewicz of the Covina
Police Department and four other police officers searched Bruce
Dougherty’s home pursuant to a search warrant for child
pornography.11 The officers seized Dougherty’s computer and other
related items but filed no charges against Dougherty related to the
search.12 Dougherty later sued the City of Covina, Officer
Bobkiewicz, and the chief of police for violating his Fourth
Amendment rights.13
Officer Bobkiewicz obtained the search warrant after submitting
an affidavit reciting certain findings from his investigation of
Dougherty that stemmed from an inappropriate touching of one of
Dougherty’s sixth-grade students.14 After learning that the student
8. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 12.
9. 923 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1990).
10. Dougherty did not appeal the case because the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
holding on other grounds. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 899–901 (affirming the dismissal without leave
to amend based on the finding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that
Dougherty failed to state a claim against the City of Covina).
11. Id. at 895.
12. Id. at 896.
13. Id. at 896–97.
14. Id. at 896.
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had won a cross-country meet, Dougherty had placed his hands on
the student’s breasts and lifted her up in front of the class to a level at
which he could look at her buttocks.15 The molested student stated
that she had previously seen Dougherty look up other female
students’ skirts and down their blouses.16 The assistant
superintendant of the school district, Gloria Cortez, also told Officer
Bobkiewicz about an investigation that she had conducted following
a student’s report in 2003 that Dougherty pulled down a female
student’s shirt while the two were alone in Dougherty’s classroom.17
This investigation revealed that Dougherty would often touch girls’
backs with his hands in search of bra straps.18 Cortez’s investigation,
however, was discontinued because of inconsistent statements made
by the student-victim, though the student’s mother later stated that
she had made a mistake in not believing her daughter.19 When
Officer Bobkiewicz later questioned the student from Cortez’s
investigation, she confirmed that Dougherty had pulled down her
shirt, adding that he “touched [my] bare breasts and told [me that I]
was ‘a special girl.’”20
Officer Bobkiewicz also stated in his affidavit that he had
fourteen years of experience in the police force, during which he had
received over a hundred hours of training involving juvenile and sex
crimes and had conducted hundreds of investigations related to
sexual assaults and juveniles.21 Because of his experience and
training, Officer Bobkiewicz was the designated “Sex
Crimes/Juvenile Detective” for the Covina Police Department.22
Officer Bobkiewicz ended his affidavit by concluding that “based
upon my training and experience . . . I know subjects involved in this
type of criminal behavior have in their possession child
pornography.”23
After reviewing Officer Bobkiewicz’s affidavit, the search
warrant, and Dougherty’s complaint, the district court dismissed

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Dougherty’s claims against the City of Covina, the chief of police,
and Officer Bobkiewicz, with prejudice, on August 4, 2009.24
According to the court, the affidavit established probable cause to
support the warrant.25 Dougherty appealed to the Ninth Circuit.26
III. THE NINTH
CIRCUIT’S REASONING
The main issue on appeal, which divided the court,27 was
whether probable cause existed to validate the warrant to search
Dougherty’s home computer and electronic media for child
pornography.28 The majority began its discussion of probable cause
by stating that “[s]ufficient information must be presented to the
magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his
action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of
others.”29 The majority then explained that affidavits containing
more than bare conclusions were valid if they survived the “totality
of the circumstances test.”30 Under this test, the “magistrate must
make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . including the veracity and
basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there
is a fair probability that contraband . . . will be found in a particular
place.”31
The majority next summarized the facts of United States v.
Weber and its holding that the search warrant for child pornography
there lacked probable cause.32 In Weber, the investigating officer
based his affidavit for probable cause on Peter Weber’s receipt of a
catalog for child pornography two years earlier and on the suspect’s
more recent purchase of four images of possible child pornography.33
The investigating officer concluded his affidavit by stating that
“from [my] knowledge of [child molesters, pedophiles, and child
24. Id. at 897.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 892.
27. Judge Brewster concurred in the judgment of the court but disagreed with the majority’s
probable-cause analysis. See id. at 901–02.
28. See id. at 897–99.
29. Id. at 897 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983)).
30. Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–39).
31. Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id. at 898 (citing United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990)).
33. Weber, 923 F.2d at 1340.
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pornography collectors, I] could expect certain things to be at their
houses.”34 In holding that the affidavit contained insufficient
probable cause to justify a search of Weber’s home, the court
emphasized that the affidavit was devoid of any evidence that Weber
was either a child molester or a child-pornography collector.35 The
court there stated that “the government could not search Weber’s
house for evidence to prove Weber was a collector merely by
alleging he was a collector.”36
Upon summarizing Weber, the Dougherty majority concluded
that probable cause could not exist to justify the search warrant of
Dougherty’s house if probable cause did not exist in Weber.37 The
majority stated that Officer Bobkiewicz’s “affidavit contain[ed] no
facts tying the acts of Dougherty . . . to his possession of child
pornography.”38 The majority then stressed that no expert had
concluded that Dougherty was a pedophile and there was no
evidence that Dougherty had ever received or possessed child
pornography, was interested in viewing such images, or conversed
with students about sex acts or pornography.39 The majority next
noted the split in jurisdictions on the question of whether evidence of
child molestation alone creates probable cause for a search warrant
for child pornography.40 It then implicitly adopted the Second and
Sixth Circuits’ approach to that question by concluding that Officer
Bobkiewicz’s conclusory statement that Dougherty, an alleged child
molester, possessed child pornography was insufficient to create
probable cause.41
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE
NINTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING
The Ninth Circuit erred thrice in Dougherty: it (1) misapplied
Weber; (2) unreasonably discounted the significant relationship
between molesting children and possessing child pornography; and

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1345.
Id.
Id.
Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 898.
Id.
Id. at 898–99.
Id. at 899.
Id.
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(3) should have upheld the search warrant according to established
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.
A. The Dougherty Majority Misapplied Weber
It is doubtful that Weber dictated the outcome in Dougherty, as
the Dougherty majority claimed. The search warrant in Weber lacked
probable cause not merely because there was insufficient evidence
that Weber possessed child pornography, as the Dougherty majority
asserted, but also—and primarily—because the affidavit there did
not “lay a foundation . . . show[ing] that the person subject to the
search [was] a member of the class” of persons who could be
expected to possess child pornography.42 Indeed, the Weber court
acknowledged that the expert opinion of a police officer could
establish probable cause in the absence of direct evidence that a
suspect possessed child pornography but found that such an opinion
was unfounded in that case.43 This was because the affidavit in
Weber contained insufficient evidence that Weber was a childpornography collector and no evidence that he was a child
molester.44
The court in Weber thus did not address the critical issue
presented in Dougherty: whether evidence of child molestation
would have been sufficient in itself to create probable cause for the
search warrant. The court, however, did suggest that such evidence
would be sufficient when it stated that the expert opinion of a police
officer regarding a particular class of people, namely child molesters,
could establish probable cause if there were evidence that the suspect
was a child molester.45 Accordingly, had there been evidence that
Weber was a child molester, as there was in Dougherty, the Weber
court could very well have held that the expert officer’s conclusion
that Weber possessed child pornography sufficiently established
probable cause for a search warrant.
The majority in Dougherty also gave undue weight to one of the
factors that the Weber court used to distinguish Weber from United
States v. Rabe,46 in which the Ninth Circuit upheld a search warrant
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990).
See id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 42–44.
848 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1988).
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for child pornography.47 The Weber court noted that in Rabe “there
was expert testimony in the affidavit which addressed the facts of the
defendant’s case and specifically concluded that based on those facts,
the defendant was a pedophile.”48 Moreover, the facts in Rabe were
sufficient to make a judgment as to whether the defendant was a
pedophile.49 In Weber, by contrast, the affidavit consisted mainly of
“rambling boilerplate recitations,” which demonstrated that “the
‘expert’ portion of the affidavit was not drafted with the facts of [the]
case or [Weber] in mind.”50 Additionally, the only evidence of
Weber’s pedophilia, other than the order solicited by the government
prior to the search, was a child-pornography catalog that had been
addressed to him that customs had seized twenty months earlier.51
The Weber court, however, only emphasized that the affidavit in
Rabe contained expert testimony that Rabe was a pedophile for a
specific and limited purpose: to distinguish Weber from Rabe.52 The
court was prompted to do so in order to dismiss the prosecution’s
attempt to analogize Weber to Rabe.53 Furthermore, because the
court had already concluded that the evidence was insufficient to
indicate that Weber was either a child molester or a childpornography collector,54 pedophilia was the only basis left on which
the investigating officer could conclude that Weber probably
possessed child pornography. As such, the court could hardly have
meant that expert opinion that a suspect is a pedophile is a necessary
factor for determining whether probable cause exists, especially
when evidence indicates that the suspect is a child-pornography
collector or child molester, as in Dougherty.55 Accordingly, the
majority in Dougherty erred in relying as heavily as it did on the

47. Id. at 998.
48. Weber, 923 F.2d at 1345 (citing Rabe, 848 F.2d at 996).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1344.
52. See id. at 1345–46.
53. Id. at 1345.
54. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 35, 44.
55. Cf. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“Weber
cannot be read to support Gourde’s position—that a search warrant for child pornography may
issue only if the government provides concrete evidence, without relying on any inferences, that a
suspect actually receives or possesses images of child pornography—without running afoul of
Gates.”).
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absence of expert testimony that Dougherty was a pedophile,56
particularly because the facts indicated that he was a child
molester,57 which would likely have been sufficient in itself to create
probable cause for the search warrant.58
B. Molesting Children Is Substantially Related
to Possessing Child Pornography
The second problem with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
Dougherty stems from its reliance on the questionable theory that
molesting children is not related to possessing child pornography—
even in the age of the Internet.59 The Dougherty majority based this
conclusion on United States v. Falso60 and United States v.
Hodson,61 which opined as much.62 These two cases, however, failed
to cite any studies or other authorities confirming that child
molestation is not associated with possessing child pornography.63 In
fact, just two years before its decision in Falso, the Second Circuit
held that “a direct connection exists between child pornography and
pedophilia,”64 a finding that it did not overrule in Falso.65 Hence, the
Dougherty majority’s determination that child molestation does not
relate to child pornography was not well founded.
Unlike the assertion that molesting children is unrelated to
possessing child pornography, the theory that there is indeed a strong
relationship between these two acts is substantially supported. The
Supreme Court has ruled that “the evidence . . . collected [to support
probable cause] must be seen and weighed not in terms of library
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of
law enforcement.”66 Adhering to the Supreme Court’s mandate, the
Eighth Circuit has reasoned that “common experience” supports a
56. The court provided five main reasons for why the search warrant in Dougherty lacked
probable cause, which included absence of expert testimony that Dougherty was a pedophile.
Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2011).
57. See supra Part II.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 69–73.
60. 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
61. 543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008).
62. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2011).
63. See Falso, 544 F.3d at 123–24; Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292–93.
64. United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2006).
65. See Falso, 544 F.3d at 123 & n.18.
66. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 418 (1981)).
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conclusion that child molesters likely possess child pornography.67
The Fifth Circuit has similarly ruled that “common sense would
indicate that a person who is sexually interested in children is likely
to also be inclined . . . to order and receive child pornography.”68
Such common-sense and experienced conclusions that child
molesters possess child pornography are further bolstered by the
“relative ease with which child pornography may be obtained on the
internet.”69 The Internet provides most people with “access to almost
any form of electronic information,”70 and it has been the “primary
medium for pornography transmission” since 1998.71 The extent to
which the Internet facilitates obtaining child pornography today is
further underscored by the Ninth Circuit’s en banc reasoning in
United States v. Gourde.72 The Gourde court distinguished that case
from Weber largely because the circumstances in Weber were
“hardly comparable” to those in Gourde since Weber did not involve
the Internet.73 Therefore, because child pornography can now be
obtained with relative ease, a law-enforcement officer specially
trained and experienced in the field of child sex abuse, like Officer
Bobkiewicz in Dougherty, should be able to conclude that an alleged
child molester possesses child pornography based solely on the
officer’s experience and on facts indicating that the suspect is a child
molester.
Even if more evidence than an expert law-enforcement officer’s
determination were required to establish probable cause that a child
molester also possesses child pornography, significant research and
findings additionally support the existence of such a relationship. In
its hearings leading up to its enactment of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996, Congress found that “child pornography is
often used by pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate and
whet their own sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual acting out

67. United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 2010).
68. United States v. Byrd, 31 F.3d 1329, 1339 (5th Cir. 1994).
69. Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578.
70. Laura Davis et al., Controlling Computer Access to Pornography: Special Conditions for
Sex Offenders, FED. PROBATION, June 1995, at 44.
71. Janik, supra note 7, at 379 & n.4 (quoting Lesli C. Esposito, Note, Regulating the
Internet: The New Battle Against Child Pornography, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 541, 541
(1998)).
72. 440 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006).
73. Id. at 1073–74 (citing United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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with children.”74 The Senate has similarly noted that “[l]aw
enforcement investigations have verified that pedophiles almost
always collect child pornography or child erotica.”75 This
pornography “[i]s an addiction that escalates,” culminating in the
“acting out” of that which the viewer has seen.76 Accordingly, since
sexually abusing children is the ultimate stage of this progression, it
is not surprising that “[l]aw-enforcement officers . . . routinely find
pornographic materials when they investigate sex crimes against
children.”77
Such congressional findings deserve a high level of judicial
dereference because Congress is the superior governmental
institution for fact finding.78 In United States v. Perillo,79 the court
found that a statute authorizing wire interception of a suspect’s
phone lines did not violate the Fourth Amendment.80 In justifying the
governmental intrusion, the court emphasized, in part, “that Congress
specifically found as a fact that such tools as wiretapping and
‘bugging’ were essential to combat organized crime.”81 The court
then demonstrated the high level of deference owed to such findings
by noting that “the Supreme Court went so far as to assume facts
which Congress might have found and then deferred to them” in
Katzenbach v. Morgan.82 Thus, the Dougherty majority should have
been more deferential to congressional findings that sexually abusing
children is related to possessing child pornography.
Independent research, moreover, confirms that child molestation
and pedophilia are substantially related to possessing child
pornography. A 2000 Federal Bureau of Prisons study revealed that
76 percent of offenders convicted of Internet-related crimes against
children admitted to previously molesting children, which law

74. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-26 to -32 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), invalidated in
part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
75. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 12–13 (1996).
76. Id. at 13.
77. Id. (quoting SHIRLEY O’BRIEN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY (1992)).
78. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 384 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“Unlike courts, Congress can readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess the
magnitude of a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy.”).
79. 333 F. Supp. 914 (D. Del. 1971).
80. Id. at 915, 923.
81. Id. at 918–19.
82. Id. at 918 n.27 (discussing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)).
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enforcement had failed to discover.83 Furthermore, these convicts
had an average of 30.5 child sex victims each.84 U.S. Postal
Inspection Service reports similarly indicate that more than
80 percent of child pornography purchasers are active abusers, and
child pornography was connected with every incident of reported
child molestation in Louisville, Kentucky, from 1980 through
1984.85 U.S. Senate Reports86 and independent articles87 also cite the
progression from watching child pornography to sexually abusing
children. For instance, a “developmental pattern” has been identified
among pedophiles who interact with children, which “begins with
fantasy, moves to gratification through pornography, then voyeurism,
and finally to contact.”88
Other behavioral analyses of child molesters have likewise
concluded that “there is little behavioral doubt that probable cause to
believe a given individual is a preferential sex offender is, by itself,
probable cause to believe the individual collects pornography . . .
related to his preferences.”89 This is because preferential child
molesters generally collect child pornography.90 Additionally,
“preferential-type offenders,” such as pedophiles, are much easier to
investigate because they exhibit these “highly predictable and
repetitive behavior patterns.”91
The results of congressional hearings and independent research
thus overwhelmingly evince a significant relationship between
pedophilia, molesting children, and possessing child pornography.
These findings provide additional support for the common-sense and
experienced conclusions of expert law-enforcement officers that such
a relationship exists where evidence suggests that a suspect is a
pedophile or child molester. The Ninth Circuit should have therefore
accepted that molesting children and possessing child pornography
83. Kim, supra note 2, at 20.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 17.
86. See S. REP. NO. 104-358 (1996).
87. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 2, at 19–20.
88. Id. at 20.
89. See, e.g., KENNETH V. LANNING, CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 106
(5th ed. 2010). A “preferential sex offender” is characterized by (1) “long-term and persistent
patterns of behavior”; (2) “specific sexual interests”; (3) “well-developed techniques”; and (4)
“fantasy-driven behavior.” Id. at 52.
90. Id. at 79.
91. Id. at 51.
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are strongly related not only because Officer Bobkiewicz stated as
much in his affidavit based on his training and experience but also
because Congress and independent research has found such a relation
to exist.
C. The Dougherty Court Should Have Upheld the
Search Warrant According to Established
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit Precedent
As the Supreme Court stated in Illinois v. Gates92 and the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged in Dougherty v. City of Covina,93 under the
“totality of the circumstances test,” a magistrate must “make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . , including the ‘veracity’
and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information,
there is a fair probability that contraband . . . will be found in a
particular place.”94 The majority in Dougherty, however, never
applied the “totality of the circumstances” test. The majority refused
to acknowledge that child molestation is substantially related to
possessing child pornography, and there were no other facts
independent of Dougherty’s alleged child molestation that indicated
that Dougherty possessed child pornography.95 Accordingly, the
Dougherty majority concluded that Officer Bobkiewicz’s affidavit
did not “move[] beyond the bare bones” of the conclusions of others
and qualify for review under the “totality of the circumstances
test.”96 However, since molesting children is substantially related to
possessing child pornography,97 the “totality of the circumstances”
test should have been applied to the facts of Dougherty.
Under the “totality of the circumstances” test, there must first
have been probable cause that Dougherty sexually abused a child
because probable cause that he possessed child pornography rested
entirely on the relationship between the two crimes.98 The majority
appears to have accepted that Officer Bobkiewicz had probable cause
to believe that Dougherty molested at least one child. The court
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

462 U.S. 213 (1983).
654 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2011)
Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 228).
Id. at 898–99.
See id. at 897–99.
See supra Part IV.B.
See Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 896.
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recounted both alleged victims’ statements that Dougherty touched
them inappropriately, and it neither refuted nor questioned the
validity of either statement.99 The majority’s discussion of the split in
jurisdictions over the issue of whether evidence of child molestation
creates probable cause for a search warrant for child pornography
also suggests that it had accepted that there was probable cause that
Dougherty had molested two children.100 The concurrence similarly
appears to have accepted that there was probable cause that
Dougherty molested the two alleged victims.101
Having established that there was probable cause that Dougherty
molested at least one child, an expert should have then been able to
conclude that Dougherty possessed child pornography.102 This is
exactly what Officer Bobkiewicz did. In his affidavit, he concluded
that “based upon [his] training and experience . . . [he knew] subjects
involved in this type of criminal behavior have in their possession
child pornography.”103 Additionally, there is no indication in either
the majority or concurring opinion104 that the affidavit “consisted of
rambling boilerplate recitations designed to meet all law enforcement
needs” or “was not drafted with the facts of this case or this
particular defendant in mind,” like the affidavit in Weber.105
To the contrary, Officer Bobkiewicz’s affidavit met the Weber
court’s requirement that “the affidavit . . . address[] the facts of the
defendant’s case and specifically conclude[] . . . based on those
facts.”106 Indeed, Officer Bobkiewicz specifically concluded—albeit
implicitly—that it was fairly probable that Dougherty possessed
child pornography based on the evidence, which was included in the
99. Id. at 896–99.
100. See id. at 899.
101. Id. at 901–02 (Brewster, J., concurring) (“I conclude the search warrant was supported
by probable cause. . . . Dougherty’s pattern of affirmative misconduct with several sixth grade
students is closely related to an interest in looking at sexual images of minors.” (citation
omitted)).
102. See id.; United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578–79 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1345 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Houston, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1059,
1064–65 (D.S.D. 2010); supra text accompanying notes 42–44; cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 231–32 (1983) (describing probable cause as “a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of
probabilities” based on evidence collected and “common-sense conclusions about human
behavior” evaluated “by those versed in the field of law enforcement.” (quoting United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981))).
103. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 896.
104. See id. at 895; id. at 901 (Brewster, J., concurring).
105. Weber, 923 F.2d at 1345.
106. Id.
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affidavit, that he touched both a current student’s breasts while
inappropriately lifting her in class and a past student’s breasts while
alone in his classroom.107 Officer Bobkiewicz also included in the
affidavit allegations that Dougherty looked up female students’ skirts
and down their blouses and searched their backs for bra straps.108
Since there was sufficient information to allow a magistrate to
find probable cause, it was then up to the district court to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the veracity and
basis of Officer Bobkiewicz’s knowledge, there was a fair
probability that child pornography would have been found at
Dougherty’s house.109 The district court did so, finding the existence
of such a fair probability to justify the search warrant.110 At this
point, the Ninth Circuit should have accepted the magistrate’s
determination because the Ninth Circuit owed “great deference” to
the magistrate’s finding and “the Fourth Amendment[] strong[ly]
prefer[s] . . . searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.”111
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has mandated that “after-the-fact
scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take
the form of de novo review.”112 Judge Brewster noted as much in her
concurrence, similarly quoting from the Supreme Court and asserting
that the magistrate judge’s determination and investigating officer’s
experience and training were owed more deference than that which
the majority afforded them.113
Even if no such deference was owed to the magistrate’s finding
of probable cause, Supreme Court precedent required the Dougherty
court to affirm the magistrate’s judgment. The Supreme Court’s
“totality of the circumstances” test is “a fluid and nontechnical
conception of probable cause,” requiring only that a “fair
probability” exist that the specified contraband will be found in the
specified location.114 The Court has also required that “evidence . . .
107. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 896.
108. Id.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 29–31.
110. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 897.
111. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
112. Id.
113. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 901–02.
114. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“In contrast to
the more exacting, technical approach to probable cause in cases before Gates, Gates itself
marked a return to the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test and emphasized that probable cause
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must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by
scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law
enforcement.”115 Furthermore, the process of determining probable
cause “deal[s] with . . . probabilities” and permits law-enforcement
officers to “formulate[] certain common-sense conclusions about
human behavior.”116
In line with these standards, it was fairly probable that
Dougherty possessed child pornography. As an expert in juvenile and
sex crimes,117 Officer Bobkiewicz had a substantial basis of
knowledge to conclude that Dougherty likely possessed child
pornography given the evidence that Dougherty was a child
molester.118 Officer Bobkiewicz was permitted to formulate his
conclusion based on this common sense and training, and the court
was to weigh the evidence as understood by Officer Bobkiewicz,
who was “versed in the field of law enforcement.”119 Finally,
because molesting children is significantly related to possessing child
pornography120 and given Officer Bobkiewicz’s expert opinion
corroborating this relationship, any ruling other than that it was fairly
probable that Dougherty possessed child pornography departs from
the practicality and common sense that the “totality of the
circumstances” test requires.
Finding probable cause to believe that Dougherty possessed
child pornography based on the facts indicating that he was a child
molester would have also been consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s
own precedent as it relates to searches for firearms in narcotics
investigations.121 In United States v. Nance,122 for instance, the court
found probable cause supporting a search warrant for firearms, which
was based mainly on evidence that the suspect was a drug dealer.123
In upholding the search warrant for one crime based on evidence of
means ‘fair probability,’ not certainty or even a preponderance of the evidence.” (citation
omitted)).
115. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231–32 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
116. Id. at 231 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418).
117. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 896.
118. See id.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 115–16.
120. See supra Part IV.B.
121. See United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Nance, 962 F.2d
860 (9th Cir. 1992).
122. 962 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1992).
123. Id. at 864.
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an entirely different crime, the court explained that the investigating
officer who submitted the affidavit “knew, based on his experience
and training, that people who distribute narcotics keep drug supplies,
paraphernalia, records and weapons in their homes.”124 Just as selling
drugs is related to possessing firearms, molesting children is related
to possessing child pornography.125 Accordingly, since the Ninth
Circuit routinely upholds search warrants for firearms where
evidence indicates that a suspect is a narcotics distributor, the court
should similarly uphold search warrants for child pornography where
evidence indicates that the suspect is a child molester.
V. CONCLUSION
By misapplying United States v. Weber, discounting the
significant relationship between molesting children and possessing
child pornography, and failing to uphold the search warrant for child
pornography, the Ninth Circuit failed to connect the logical dots in
its holding in Dougherty v. City of Covina. These three errors
consequently add up to one significant consequence: the court has
made obtaining search warrants for child pornography much more
difficult for law-enforcement officers.
The significant harms that child pornography inflicts on the
children involved demonstrates the severity of this consequence.
Perhaps one the most troubling aspects of child pornography is that
“it inflames the desires of child molesters, pedophiles, and child
pornographers who prey on children, thereby increasing the creation
and distribution of child pornography and the sexual abuse and
exploitation of actual children who are victimized as a result of the
existence and use of these materials.”126 Additionally, child
molesters often use child pornography as part of a method of
seducing other children into sexual activity.127 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit en banc should overrule the dangerous precedent that
Dougherty v. City of Covina established. It would, however, be even
more ideal for the U.S. Supreme Court to settle the split among the
federal appellate courts in favor of facilitating search warrants for
child pornography based on evidence that the suspect is a child
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
See supra Part IV.B.
S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 2 (1996).
Id.
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molester. This would extinguish the socially harmful consequences
of Dougherty and its Second and Sixth Circuit ilk throughout the
entire country and connect the logical dots between sexually abusing
a child and possessing child pornography. Such a decision by either
the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court would accordingly advance
the intentions of Congress128 and more fully comport with the less
exacting requirements for determining probable cause that the
Supreme Court established in Gates.129

128. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-26 to -32 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), invalidated
in part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002); cf. Janik, supra note 7, at 379
(“The legislation [H.R. REP. NO. 104-90 (1995)] subjects suspected child pornographers to
lessened search and seizure requirements . . . .”).
129. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).

